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Abstract— Zero-day malware which is created by cyber 
deviants is a critical risk and menace because neither machines 
nor cyber security tools can easily detect them. Phishing emails 
are the most common point of intrusion for attackers, who 
randomly send malware to general users. Based on the rise of 
phishing emails with zero-day malware behavior, the research 
workshop uses information security analysis tools as well as 
develop new tools to define an investigation procedure to 
investigate malware behavior in order to meet the aims of 
understanding them better, being able to track them effectively, 
and collect information to find and help infected victims inside an 
organization’s network.   
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I. INTRODUCTION 
Phishing emails containing zero-day malware is a serious 
problem that is increasing every year. A recent example of a 
critical case for cyber security is a new type of ransomware 
named Wanacry (or Wanacrypt or WanaCypt0r or 
WanaDecyrpt0r) which was first reported on 12 May 2017. By 
using spear phishing emails combined with the EternalBlue 
exploit and DoublePlusar backdoor, plus a vulnerability in 
older versions of the Windows operating system, the attack 
was able to spread very successfully and threatened victims to 
pay the ransom through a digital currency, Bitcoin. Over 
300,000 PC’s were affected in 3 days across 150 countries. 
Only a single click by any user would cause the malicious 
behavior to spread over an entire organization’s network, 
compromising the availability of its stored information which 
is a very difficult situation for both users and IT professionals 
to investigate and resolve such a problem. 
This workshop focuses on two research paths: (i) investigating 
phishing emails to find malware behavior and (ii) advances in 
malware analysis for cyber security and risk. The paths have 
been designed to track malware behavior, collect information, 
filter for useful facts, and use this to prepare for the next 
 
 
zero-day attack, as well as improving technical processing by 
developing effective and efficient solutions. 
By configuring a mail server and simulating an independent 
network environment, separate from the general network, we 
can operate investigation procedures. The operation process 
starts with an online investigation, then a file format 
investigation, surface analysis, basic dynamic analysis and 
advanced static analysis on brand new phishing emails, as well 
as assisting feature collection for data mining and further 
understanding malware behaviors. The process also targets 
industry representatives from anti-virus and IDS-IPS tools that 
aim to stop cybercrime committed by terrorists. In this paper 
we present the simulation results and discussion in the Results 
and Discussion section. Finally, we conclude this work and 
propose future work in the Conclusion section. 
II. RELATED WORK 
 This section presents related works: 
A. Zero-day attack 
A zero-day attack is a cyber-attack exploiting a vulnerability 
that has not been disclosed publicly. There is almost no 
defense against a zero-day attack: while the vulnerability 
remains unknown, the software affected cannot be patched and 
anti-virus products cannot detect the attack through 
signature-based scanning because in general, zero-day attack 
data is not available until after the attack is discovered. 
Zero-day vulnerabilities are believed to be used primarily for 
carrying out targeted attacks, this is based on post-mortem 
analysis revealing vulnerabilities that security analyses have 
connected to zero-day attacks [13]. By searching 11 million 
Windows hosts over a period of 4 years to identify executable 
files that are linked to exploits of known vulnerabilities, 
Symantec Research Lab identified 18 vulnerabilities exploited 
in the wild before their disclosure, 11 of which were not 
previously known to have been employed in a zero-day attack 
[5]. After the disclosure of zero-day vulnerabilities, the 
volume of attacks that exploit them increases by up to 5 orders 
of magnitude. McQueen et al. [12] analyzed the lifespan of 
known zero-day vulnerabilities in order to estimate the real 
number of zero-day vulnerabilities that existed in the past. In 
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contrast to this previous research, we analyze the malware 
behavior and collect data on real hosts infected with malware, 
to understand how to prevent, find and recover victims inside a 
local network. 
B.  Malicious Code Analysis 
Malicious code analyzing has been a popular research topic 
in recent years, so accordingly, a number of analysis methods 
already exist. Static analysis and Dynamic analysis are two 
main techniques that the research has divided. Static analysis is 
the process of analyzing a program’s code without actually 
executing it. Christodorescu et al. [6], introduced a technique 
that uses model checking to identify parts of a program that 
implement a previously specified, malicious code template. 
This technique has been modified to allow for more general 
code templates and the use of advanced static analysis 
techniques in [7]. Kruegel et al. [9], developed a static analysis 
technique to identify malicious behavior in kernel modules 
that indicate a rootkit. While Kirda et al. [8], researched a 
behavioral-based approach that relies heavily on static code 
analysis to detect Internet Explorer plug-ins that present 
spyware-like behavior. However, the weakness of static 
analysis is that the code analyzed may not necessarily be the 
code that is actually run. In particular, this is true for 
self-modifying programs that use polymorphic or 
metamorphic techniques [14] and downloaders. Malware may 
also draw from a wide range of obfuscation mechanisms [10, 
11] that may make static analysis very difficult. 
 While static analysis is a naturally safe and useful detection 
method, code that can be obfuscated breaches its fundamental 
limits, and so dynamic analysis is more commonly used. 
Borders et al. [15], presented a behavior-based approach that 
aims to dynamically detect evasive malware by injecting user 
input into the system and monitoring the resulting actions. In 
addition, a number of approaches exist that directly analyze the 
code dynamically. Moser et al. [4] explored multiple execution 
paths of Windows executables for malware analysis by 
tracking how a program processes interesting input (e.g., the 
local time, file checks, reads from the network) and Crandall et 
al. [16] researched on the detection of hidden, time-based 
triggers in malware which attempt to automatically discover 
time-dependent behavior by setting different values for the 
system time. Our research is using a basic dynamic analysis to 
manually investigate malware files and architecture before and 
after execution, as well as monitoring and tracking malware 
behavior while the processes are actively running. 
III. METHODOLOGY 
In this section, we present the method of malware investigation 
process in 3 parts. The first part presents the experimental 
malware and simulation topology overview. The second part 
presents the Online and URL investigation procedures, and 
finally the last part focuses on the file investigation procedures 
based on both basic dynamic analysis and static analysis. 
A.  Simulation 
Malicious emails are usually sent with phishing URL or 
attachment file inside. Before clicking or running the 
malicious file, the kind of threat or how critical the damage 
will be after, is unpredictable. To analyze and investigate 
malware effectively and in a real environment, we setup a mail 
and recording server, as well as preparing a client PC with a 
Windows operating system, that is separated from the main 
network to analyze malware. The purpose of the independent 
network is to prevent the chance of malware infecting the 
network and spreading to unprotected hosts. The environment 
used in this scopes minimizes this risk. Malicious emails 
which are suspected to contain malware is forwarded from 
outside the network to the mail server. We also prepared a 
number of analyzing tools which were installed on the client 
PC, such as Sandboxie, Toolwiz Time Freeze, TrID, BinTexT, 
Process Explorer, Process Monitor, and others. Tcpdump is 
used to record every transaction from the client PC to the 
internet and then reviewed using Wireshark. 
B.  URL and Online Investigation 
In cases where phishing emails contain suspicious URL links, 
the investigation process starts from a URL site survey. By 
collecting information from cyber security sites such as 
Urlquery.net; Aguse.jp; Virustotal.com; etc., we can receive 
some basic information. Next, we execute tcpdump on the 
recording server to record the traffic to the internet before 
accessing the suspicious URL link. We analyze the recorded 
traffic using Wireshark, tracking the communication between 
the client and the target site. Every protocol used in the 
transaction between the client and outside hosts are hints 
showing the malware’s behavior. Sometimes they are phishing 
sites with or without a digital signature, fraudulently asking for 
the victim’s account username and password, or tricking the 
user in to installing malicious software. If there is a file 
download, or installation process here, we will continue to the 
next part, file investigation and monitoring.    
C.   Suspicious File Investigation 
Normally, phishing emails that contain suspicious files 
randomly generate both the header information (subject and 
body) and the receiver’s address. A common tactic is to use a 
subject and filename that does not disclose any discernable 
information, instead use titles with random numbers that is 
clearly not specified for the target. However, the most 
dangerous phishing emails these days are Spear phishing 
attacks. The header of these emails might contain an important 
message or keyword that convinces the user to open the file or 
click on the link, for example: An important message from a 
CEO, a bank account update, online payment, email account 
lock, or even a parking area issue. The first part of the process 
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starts with the file format investigation. By using analysis tools 
such as TrID or BinText, we can learn what file format is 
hidden inside. Surface analysis follows this. This analysis uses 
internet tools to detect if the malware is new or common. The 
specimen is uploaded to analysis sites that will display known 
useful information. It also takes the hash value of the specimen 
and performs a retrieval with it. If the malware is already 
known, it is identified at this point. Another surface analysis is 
a character string extraction; we attempt to retrieve 
information from the character string contain in the file like ip 
address, url, etc.   
The next process is a basic dynamic analysis, started by using 
Process Monitor combined with Process Explorer to monitor 
the Windows system processes while compiling malware, as 
well as using Regshot to check changes in the registry before 
and after malware operation. We track the malware behavior 
by following system calls and child processes that occur after 
execution. Network traffic is also an important key in this 
process, so we combine the process investigation with the 
tcpdump to track the packet information sent and received 
from each process.  
Some malwares are very calm and sometime they take long 
time waiting quietness without any operation or hiding their 
tasks inside operating system’s common processes such as 
explorer.exe or powershell.exe, so it is difficult to track this 
type of malware. Because of this reason, we also develop an 
active method for spyware detection to keep monitoring 
network traffic and search for suspicious behavior. By using 
this tool, any suspicious both outgoing and incoming packets 
are scanned and matching with general keywords such as host 
name, private ip address or other additional keywords to find 
out which one are generated by spyware. After completing this 
part of the analysis process, we are almost done understanding 
the malware’s behavior. We place static analysis into the final 
process, using “IDA Pro” disassembler and reverse 
engineering to discover the instructions inside the malicious 
source code, then preform dynamic analysis again using 
Ollydbg. This is a comprehensive analysis as the debugger 
allows insight to the values stored on each register and in 
memory to add additional details about malware.   
D.  Dynamic Signature 
After completed two main processes of investigation, the 
information from each analysis is used to form part of the 
dynamic signature which could be used to widen the scope to 
match a family of malware to a single signature. Dynamic 
signatures combine static-signature and behavior-based 
approaches used in a proof-of-concept detection test which 
verifies its ability to detect malware from within its family. The 
structure of dynamic signatures allows them to be matched to a 
larger set of malware than any static-based approach presented 
in previous works. The dynamic signature also has advantage 
over behavior-based function call graphs because they allow 
for resources as features. Combining resources in a function 
call graph [18] eases the constraint on operations performed, 
which is easily defeated by obfuscation methods. A behavioral 
graph is a directed graph that is represented by a tuple 
𝐺𝑚=(𝑉,𝐸,𝑂). Where 𝑉 is a finite set of vertices, 𝑂 is finite set 
of operations, and E is a finite set of edges along ordered 
triplets in that 𝐸:𝑉×𝑂×𝑉. Implementation of the dynamic 
signature and use of the detection procedure in anti-virus and 
IDS would increase their current observable set of malware. 
Figure 3. Shows a dynamic signature created by combining the 
significant events determined by each investigation step. 
Starting at the malicious.docx file represented by “V1”, which 
each edge connects two resources with an associated 
operation. An edge (𝑣𝑛,𝑣𝑛+1,𝑜𝑛) in 𝐸 expresses that the resource 
𝑣𝑛 applied the operation 𝑜𝑛 to resource 𝑣𝑛+1. Therefore, an 
edge represents a significant event that occurred between two 
resources. Given the first edge, 𝑒1=(𝑣1,𝑣2,𝑜1) which links a new 
resource to the source executable resource, there exists a path 
from 𝑣2 to 𝑣1. Since any new resource, 𝑣𝑛 must be added on an 
edge 𝑒𝑖=(𝑣𝑥,𝑣𝑖+1,𝑜𝑧), where 𝑣𝑥 is already an element of 𝑉, there 
always exists a path from 𝑣1 to 𝑣𝑛, thus proving the resource is 
used by the malware. Each of the 46 vertices were created as 
representations of the 46 most significant resources that 
contribute to the malicious behavior of the malware.  
 
Fig. 2.  Method Lifecycle 
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IV. RESULT & DISCUSSION 
From phishing emails received, we have completed behavioral 
analyses and tracked malware information resulting in more 
than 86 characteristics within 4 months and this investigation 
is still ongoing. After simulation and investigation into 
malware, the results and all information related to malware and 
its behavior including survey date, summary, phishing email 
subject and content, type of threat, time, source-destination, ip 
address, hash value, screenshot, etc. will be updated and 
published on to the internal web server [17]. The data on the 
web server can be referenced in the case of a user receiving a 
similar malicious email. We are able to give them advice on 
how to deal with the phishing email. In the worst case users 
might have already been infected with the virus without them 
noticing and so the purpose of the database will be to find 
victims inside a network by comparing potential victim’s 
behavior with that of malware’s behavior; to help the victim 
and protect the network as fast as possible. 
Zero-day malware is usually not detected by machine IDS or 
online investigation, and is difficult to investigate with static or 
dynamic analysis. Therefore, you should always keep your 
eyes open for updates on system vulnerabilities in the news or 
patches and update information that may be the key to 
protecting your system. We also keep focusing on Wannacry 
ransomware and its similarity behavior and vulnerability 
attack.  
Refer to the current information, our next research will focus 
on developing this manual investigation process to an 
automatic system, which can learn, track and give rapid 
responding by machine learning, as well as upgrading an 
active method of spyware detection in advance to catch up any 
suspicious behaviors which operate without user’s permission.  
V. CONCLUSION 
We have presented a process of investigation into phishing and 
malicious emails in a real environment where some of them are 
assumed to be zero-day attacks. Within four months there were 
86 characteristics extracted from the phishing emails. The 
propose of this research is investigate malware behavior, and 
aims to better understand and track them effectively, as well as 
collect information to find and help infected victims inside an 
organization’s network. Thus, continued investigation and 
updating of analyzed results to the server is necessary. The 
advantage of recording data is also useful for managing 
network security, policy, and update information to 
organization members.  
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